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Abstract 
 
his paper examines macroeconomic performance and policy environment of post-
independent sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) vis-à-vis remittance flows to the sub-region. The 
paper finds that SSA is the only developing region in the world that still depends on foreign 
aid as its leading external non-debt capital and attracts the least remittances, 
notwithstanding the positive growth trend since the pursuit of economic policy reforms in the 
1980s. In general, low inflation, higher real income growth, domestic savings, investment, 
exports, financial development, and fiscal policy effectiveness strongly and positively 
correlate with remittance inflows. This implies remittances are likely to be driven by sound 
macroeconomic environment in recipient countries. An affirmation of this finding is that, in 
SSA, (and, indeed, for all developing economies), remittances are pro-cyclical and positively 
correlate with macroeconomic performance and stability.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Of the 54 sovereign states in Africa, 48 of them are in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Nearly all these SSA 
countries became politically independent from the imperial European masters in the 1960s with Ghana being 
the first within the sub-region in March 1957. Ethiopia and Liberia were fully independent states whereas 
Sudan just as Egypt was never colonised by any European colonial empire, but were effectively under 
British administration between 1882 and 1922. 
 
Although the sub-region is blessed with abundant human and natural resources, it has consistently remained 
the poorest and the least developed in the world. This is clearly evident in the consistent ranking of more 
than 75% of SSA countries in the bottom quartile by the United Nations in its Human Development Reports 
over the years. Furthermore, 33 out of the 48 SSA countries have attained the unenviable status of being debt 
trapped and as a result fall into the category of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) as at June 2010. 
 
The post-independence political atmosphere in SSA has generally been unstable as public expectations of 
ordinary citizens were very high and issues related to nationality, cultural identity, tribe and ethnicity, as well 
as the type of economic system and brand of political regime to adopt became predominant. In response, 
probably out of over anxiety, fear of insecurity and pressure to please loyalists, most leaders committed 
some fundamental mistakes in leadership, governance and in the formulation as well as implementation of 
economic policies. In the end, it was quite clear that most leaders were unable to forge national entity that 
transcended the various ethnic, political, geographical, religious, social and economic interests in their 
countries. The perceived absence of transparency and fairness in the distribution of national resources 
resulted in frequent military interventions in state governance in the sub-region until very recently. Thus, 
although most SSA countries became republics and tried to adopt parliamentary democracy under 
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presidential system of governance, practically, none of these countries succeeded in maintaining the 
momentum on a permanent basis as they cycled through coup d’états that ushered in military governments 
and dictators. For instance, within a decade of post-independence, SSA recorded not less than 21 successful 
coups between 1960 and 1969 and at least 58 successful presidential and other high-profile political 
assassinations between 1961 and 2005. 
 
Notwithstanding the Darfur crisis, which has been ongoing since February 2003, the Somalia civil war, the 
Chad civil war and the hardly settled border and territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the 
right of ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, largely, the political economy of modern SSA appears to be 
relatively more stable since post-independence. Today, virtually every SSA country has what can be 
described as a multi-party democratically-elected president. Again, collectively, countries within the SSA 
sub-region now visibly frown on military take-overs, dictatorships, and the use of constitutionally 
unapproved means to assume political leadership. More than ever before, the African Union and the 
international community, especially western trade and donor partners now act very swiftly to sanction 
governments and leaders that violate human rights, adopt extremist discrimination practices, and exploit 
undemocratic means to assume political leadership in countries within the sub-region. For instance, 
unprecedented in the history of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the sub-
regional body acted very swiftly to review the political and security situation in Côte d’Ivoire after the 
declaration of certified second round Presidential election results on 28 November 2010. Subsequently, 
ECOWAS issued a statement within ten days after the elections to denounce the incumbent President, 
Laurent Gbagbo, and asked him to concede defeat without delay. This is expected to continue to create the 
propitious environment for some consistency in the formulation and implementation of pro-growth and 
sustainable development policies under adopted national economic development programmes towards the 
socioeconomic progress of the sub-region. 
 
The strides being made in improving good governance and building stronger state institutions signify 
reduced political risks necessary for creating the ideal investment environment required for the mobilisation 
of critical resources in SSA. Apart from the encouraging developments on the political landscape of the sub-
region, various macroeconomic policy reform programmes were adopted and implemented by SSA countries 
since political independence in the 1960s. Each of these programmes were, among other things, centred on 
mobilising domestic and external resources, crucial to the socioeconomic development agenda of the sub-
region, as SSA has been identified as the region most lacking critical resources (Devarajan et al., 2002; 
Gupta et al., 2006). And as the sub-region is identified as one of the leading net exporters of skilled and 
unskilled labour to the industrialised world (Migration Policy Institute, 2006), the question that has remained 
unanswered is: Has the implementation of various macroeconomic policies led to higher inflows of migrant 
remittances during the post-independence era? In other words, are remittances inflows from SSA migrants 
from abroad responsive to changing macroeconomic policy environment? In order to find the appropriate 
response to this question, this paper seeks to basically explore the relationship between the changing inflows 
of migrant remittances and the various macroeconomic policies implemented by SSA as a sub-region since 
independence. In doing so, rather than adopting rigorous macroeconometric analytical approach, this paper 
uses a set of simple descriptive statistics to provide an insight into the performance of the sub-region in 
attracting remittances during the post-independence era. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the analysis of the magnitude and trends of 
remittances as an external capital flows to SSA. This is also the Section in which the correlation between 
remittances and selected macroeconomic indicators are carried out. The stylised facts on remittance flows to 
SSA are presented in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes with some policy imperatives for SSA as a sub-region. 
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2. Remittances as an external capital flow to SSA (1960-2009) 
 
2.1 Composition and trends in external capital flows to SSA: A global outlook 
 
Conventionally, besides contractual loans, capital flows to SSA and other developing economies are a 
composition of foreign direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA), and portfolio equity. 
In recent years, however, remittances have emerged as a complementary source of external capital for 
developing countries. Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts the trends in external capital flows to the various 
developing economies of the world. 
 
Figure 1 shows the trends in external capital flows to SSA since 1960. Clearly, external capital flows to SSA 
were generally low during the pre-reforms era. From the reforms era in the 1980s and onwards, there have 
been somewhat consistent low upward trends in external capital flows to the sub-region even though these 
trends except for migrant remittances have been fluctuating widely. On the average, the least external capital 
inflow is portfolio equity whereas, consistently, ODA has been the highest inflow to the sub-region since 
independence. As depicted in Figure 1, the sub-region has not been successful in attracting external capital 
inflows in a consistent manner, except probably for migrant remittances. Arguably, the apparent consistency 
in the inflows of migrant remittances could be attributed to the continuously growing poverty in the sub-
region and development gap between SSA and the industrialised world. The persistently high rates of 
unemployment and underemployment, a feature of developing countries and the ever-increasing income gap 
have become a recipe for emigration and remittance inflows in SSA. In this case, driven by altruism, 
migrants from SSA are compelled to continue to remit home, mainly for consumption purposes, so long as 
the economic conditions at home do not improve. Miotti et al. (2010: 17) notes that, given the severity of 
poverty within the sub-region, unlike migrants from other developing world, SSA migrants are compelled to 
“send money for current expenditures rather than for investment purposes”. 
 
 
Figure 1: External capital flows to SSA, 1960-2009 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010) 
 
 
Under this circumstance, international migrants from the sub-region are compelled to remit to their families 
back at home for altruistic motives and not in response to successful implementation of economic policies by 
governments. As evident from various survey studies from different parts of the world migrant remittances 
are mainly used for consumption (Tongamoa, 1987; Hayes, 1993; Miotti et al., 2010), and most migrants 
from poor countries are under social obligations to remit home (Morauta, 1985; Tongamoa, 1987; Brown 
and Poirine, 2005). It should, however, be emphasised that as to whether a migrant will patronise the formal 
financial sector in remitting home or use the unofficial money transfer channel, is largely dependent upon the 
degree of financial efficiency, an aspect of financial development which incorporates the cost of financial 
service delivery including the cost of international money transfers. Unofficial money transfer channels are 
private and often unorganised money transfer channels to target recipients in developing countries. These 
channels may include funds sent through fellow international migrants travelling home and individuals who 
act as agents for informal money institutions. Also, migrant easy access for migrants to offshore banking 
services, online banking and the availability of innovative international financial products, which are all 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
C
ap
ita
l I
nf
lo
w
s (
%
 o
f G
D
P)
Years
Figure 1: External Capital Flows to SSA, 1960-2009
ODA, net inflows (% of GDP) Portfolio equity, net inflows (% of GDP)
Migrant remittances received (% of GDP) FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
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aspects of financial system development, can be instrumental in attracting remittances through the formal 
financial sector. 
 
Figure 2 reconfirms the information in Figure 1 that, generally, there has been a positive growth trend in 
remittances received in SSA and other developing economies, when measured as remittances received per 
migrant. This trend is also consistent with what is revealed in Figure A1 as well as Figure A2 in the 
Appendix. With the exception of ECA which recorded a sharp drop in remittance flows between 1970 and 
1990, virtually all the developing regions, including SSA, have witnessed a consistent positive growth trend 
in migrant remittances per migrant. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Migrant remittances received per migrant (US$) in developing economies, 1970-2009* 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010) 
*Computation based on 5-year data point intervals for which data is available on total international migration stock reported in WDI 
by the World Bank (2010).  
 
 
Although SSA is the least recipient of remittances per migrant, both in total amount and in terms of growth 
since 1970, like many other developing economies, the sub-region has witnessed a positive growth trend 
since the post-reforms era. What is clear from Figure 2 above is that, on the average, international migrants 
have been increasing the amount they send home overtime. This may be due to the ever-increasing income 
gap between industrialised countries where migrants are resident and developing countries where migrants 
are natives. Another possible reason is that developing countries which are the exporters of migrants, have 
not been able to improve the circumstances under which their citizens live;  hence the compelling need for 
migrants to keep increasing remittances in support of  families left behind to enable them  to access  basic 
human needs such as food, clothing and healthcare. Also, in particular, between the years 2000 and 2005, 
there was an upsurge in remittances per migrant to SSA and, indeed, to other developing economies. This 
may be due to how the United States of America and many advanced countries, which are the main host of 
international migrants, strengthened regulations and clampdown on international funds transfers through 
informal channels following the September-11, 2001 Al Qaeda attack.  
 
Thus, unlike in the past, migrants are now obliged to transfer funds home using official channels. It is also 
likely that more migrants from SSA might now be more interested in returning home. Several studies, 
including Merkle and Zimmermann (1992), Brown (1997), and Cai (2003) found that migrant intention to 
return home (or future migration plans) has a strong positive impact on  the probability of remitting  and the 
amount of funds transferred by migrants.  The magnitude and trend in external capital flows to SSA appear 
quite unique from what occurs in other developing economies of the world as shown in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix. For instance, as shown in Figure A1, migrant remittances are either the highest (as is the case for 
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Middle East and North Africa (MNA) and South Asia (SAS)) or the second-highest (as is the case for East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)) external 
capital inflows, but in the case of SSA alone, migrant remittance inflows are only slightly higher than 
portfolio equity inflows. Again, in SSA, ODA has remained consistently the highest external capital inflows 
to the sub-region, but for all other developing economies, ODA has either been the lowest (as is the case for 
EAP and LAC) or the second-lowest (as is the case for ECA, MNA and SAS). Since the inflows of FDI are 
generally driven by profit motives whereas ODA are mainly linked to humanitarianism of donor institutions, 
the fact that SSA constantly receives ODA as the highest form of external capital inflows is a signal that the 
sub-region has not been able to implement the appropriate economic policies to pull quality external 
resources to advance its growth and development in a sustainable fashion. 
 
It is also of interest to note that migrant remittances have been the most consistent growing external capital 
flows to developing economies in the world whilst ODA and portfolio equity have been the most volatile as 
shown in Figure A1. Apart from its high volatility, generally, ODA to developing economies has been 
declining. This is an indication that it will be prudent for developing countries, particularly those in SSA, to 
put policy measures in place to facilitate an improved mobilisation of non-aid investment-related external 
capital to finance their development projects as well as to enable them to address their numerous 
underdevelopment problems on a permanent basis. Evidently, migrant remittances have been the least 
sensitive to shocks given its high relative smooth pattern inflows to SSA and other developing economies. 
Another important observation is that whereas there seems to be a somewhat general positive correlation 
between FDI and migrant remittance inflows to developing economies, in contrast, there seems to be a 
negative relationship between migrant remittance inflows and ODA across the developing world. Thus, 
developing economies that attract higher migrant remittances also attract higher FDI but relatively lower 
ODA and vice versa. For instance, while being the sub-region receiving the least remittances, SSA also 
receives the least FDI but the most recipient of ODA, whereas the opposite condition commonly holds for 
the other developing economies (see Figure A1). 
 
According to altruistic theory, given the income of the migrant, remittances should negatively correlate with 
the income level of the target recipients (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rapoport and Docquire, 2006). Indeed, 
some macro-level studies notably Bougha-Hagbe (2004) and World Bank (2006) conclude that in countries 
with less developed financial systems remittances are countercyclical. Contrary to this highly held view of 
remittance counter-cyclicality, it has been revealed in this study that, migrant remittance inflows generally 
correlate positively with real GDP per capita, growth in real per capita GDP, real GDP growth and even real 
GDP per person employed in developing economies as shown in Table 1 (for most recent evidence and a 
more detailed analysis on SSA, see Adenutsi et al., 2011: 143). Other empirical studies which found that 
remittances are largely pro-cyclical in the recipient countries include studies by the IMF (2005), Sayan 
(2006), and Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007). 
 
It can also be seen that migrant remittances are more strongly positively correlated with gross domestic 
savings and investment rather than what is popularly believed, namely that remittances are purely for 
consumption purposes and driven by altruism. If, indeed, remittances are spent on consumption in 
developing countries, then they are more likely to be spent on imported consumer goods as found by 
Tongamoa (1987) rather than on domestically produced goods. This is because as revealed in Table 1, there 
is a strong negative correlation between migrant remittances and household final consumption expenditure 
(HFCE) whereas they positively and robustly correlated with the import of goods in developing countries. 
This is one of the most consistent results across all the developing economies in the world. One should, 
however, be cautious in concluding that remittances are likely to be used for imports, since the correlation 
between the former and exports is also strongly positive for all developing countries. What seems clear from 
the foregoing is that migrant remittance inflows are likely to be highly associated with economic openness, 
given the high positive correlation coefficients with imports and exports as a proportion of GDP. However, 
although SSA has higher trade openness than ECA, the latter receives more remittances than the former. In 
addition, there is no basis to conclude that remittances are a substitute for exports in developing countries. 
Indeed, remittances, in excess of present consumption can be used in financing income-generating activities, 
leading to increased output and exports in labour-exporting countries. 
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It is also observed that remittance inflows are positively associated with improved current balance in migrant 
exporting developing countries. The correlation between migrant remittances received and portfolio equity is 
low and generally insignificant (with none attaining 45%). Conversely, the correlation between FDI and 
remittances is positive and robust for developing economies, except for EAP where the relationship is 
negative but low. Further evidence on the negative correlation between remittances and domestically 
produced consumables in developing countries can be ascribed to the strong positive relationship between 
remittances and gross fixed capital formation (a proxy for domestic investment) as well as remittances 
domestic savings. For SSA, the correlation between remittances and savings is 87% whilst that between 
remittances and investment is 54%. One intriguing results obtained in Table 1 is that, in SSA, just as is the 
case in all other developing regions, remittance inflows is negatively correlated with the rate of inflation. 
This implies either that migrant remittances contribute to reducing inflation in labour-exporting countries or 
that price stability is a sine qua non for remittance inflows to developing countries. Finally, taking the 
correlation coefficients into account, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the 
volume of migrant remittance inflows and migrant remittances received per capita in the context of 
macroeconomic implications. 
 
 
Table 1: 
Correlation between migrant remittances and selected macroeconomic indicators, 1990-2009* 
 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010)   
Note: MRPC and MRem denote migrant remittances per capita and gross migrant remittances received respectively.  
*The time coverage was reduced to 1990-2009 due to data constraint. 
 
 
2.2 The dynamics of remittance inflows and the macroeconomic environment in SSA 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, there seems to be sufficient evidence for two stylised facts regarding 
remittance flows to developing countries: (i) geographically smaller countries are more likely to attract 
relatively higher migrant remittances probably because, as a result of their size, there is stronger social 
cohesion and ties; and (ii) although poorer countries are more likely to attract higher remittances because of 
hostile domestic economic conditions which encourage higher cross-border migration, remittance flows to 
these poor countries are not automatic but dependent on some macroeconomic fundamentals. For instance, 
as shown in Table 2, in terms of real GDP per capita, Seychelles, Mauritius, Botswana, Swaziland and Cape 
Verde can be described as relatively rich within the sub-region. Yet, in relative terms, these countries were 
the leading recipients of migrant remittances in SSA after only Lesotho between 1980 and 2009. Similarly, 
remaining countries in the top-10 remittance-dependent countries category such as Senegal, Comoros, 
Lesotho, Gambia, Lesotho and Sudan are by far, less poorer than Niger, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia and Malawi, classified among the least-10 remittance-dependent countries as depicted in Figure 3. 
Thus, considering real GDP per capita, it is observed that the very poorest countries in the sub-region 
(Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Sierra Leone) are among the least-10 remittance-dependent countries 
MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.727  0.721  0.008  0.007  0.721  0.717  0.152  0.219  0.079   0.071  0.451  0.457  
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) -0.185 -0.189 0.932  0.931  0.280  0.269  0.874  0.899  0.946   0.944  0.653  0.653  
GDP (constant 2000 US$) 0.986  0.984  0.881  0.881  0.961  0.962  0.840  0.917  0.971   0.968  0.954  0.956  
GDP growth (annual %) 0.197  0.196  0.389  0.387  0.193  0.184  0.128  0.124  0.428   0.418  0.489  0.475  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 0.985  0.983  0.868  0.868  0.940  0.944  0.855  0.927  0.886   0.879  0.953  0.955  
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.296  0.294  0.384  0.381  0.287  0.278  0.231  0.249  0.408   0.399  0.512  0.498  
GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $) 0.141  0.145  0.859  0.860  0.842  0.847  0.864  0.905  0.975   0.973  0.960  0.964  
Exports of goods (% of GDP) 0.889  0.884  0.438  0.437  0.874  0.864  -      -      0.951   0.949  0.850  0.846  
Imports of goods (% of GDP) 0.760  0.755  0.479  0.478  0.805  0.794  0.206  0.071  0.954   0.956  0.740  0.729  
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 0.801  0.800  0.285  0.288  0.068  0.081  0.442  0.458  0.922   0.922  0.540  0.542  
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 0.940  0.940  -0.018 -0.017 0.738  0.736  0.813  0.848  0.785   0.782  0.867  0.867  
HFCE (% GDP) -0.985 -0.984 -0.037 -0.038 -0.856 -0.851 -0.805 -0.822 -0.859 -0.853 -0.927 -0.929
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) -0.223 -0.220 -0.386 -0.385 -0.522 -0.512 0.096  -0.016 -0.2955 -0.284 -0.247 -0.2448
Portfolio equity, net inflows (% of GDP) 0.429  0.424  0.243  0.240  -0.171 -0.162 0.004  0.029  0.199   0.196  0.095  0.078  
SSAEAP ECA LAC MNA SAS
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(Table 2). Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Uganda and Togo, however, managed to defy the odds and are among the 
top-10 remittance-dependent within the sub-region in recent years, when measured relative to GDP or 
population size in recent years (see Figure A4). 
 
 
Table 2: 
Comparative analysis of Top-10 and Bottom-10 migrant remittances per capita recipients in SSA 
 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010) 
Note: Averages were computed for each country for only the years from 1980-2009 for which data was available. C-Verde, S-Leone, 
and MAD stand for Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, and Madagascar respectively. 
 
 
Broadly, the top-10 remittance-dependent countries in SSA are those with relatively higher tax revenue, 
exports and imports of goods, FDI, domestic investment, financial deepening, bank credit to private sector 
ratio and real interest rate, but lower rate of inflation and domestic savings. These leading remittance 
recipients in per capita terms also have higher household consumption expenditure and real GDP per capita. 
However, taking a cursory look at country-specific features, it is observed that, with the exception of Sudan, 
the top-10 remittance-recipient countries in per capita terms are those with a stronger fiscal policy stance in 
terms of tax revenue mobilisation. Furthermore, countries which are successful in attracting higher 
remittances in per capita terms are those with more developed financial systems when measured in terms of 
improved financial depth and credit to the private sector over the past three decades. This is also true for 
countries that lead in attracting remittances in absolute volumes and, even in terms of GDP (see Figure A4). 
It should also be noted that Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger, can be described as the very poorest in the sub-
region, taking into account real per capita GDP, but are not successful with the implementation of fiscal and 
monetary policies (measured by the aforementioned criteria), are also the very least in attracting migrant 
remittances as well as FDI. Consequently, it can be argued that the success in implementing fiscal and 
monetary policies, to some reasonable extent, could play a significant role in attracting migrant remittances 
from abroad. Alternatively, remittances could be important in determining the success of fiscal and monetary 
policy implementation in remittance-recipient countries within the sub-region. 
Lesotho C-Verde Mauritius Swaziland Seychelles Botswana Senegal Sudan Comoros Gambia Mean Cor_
Migrant remittances  per capita  (US$) 203.28      183.57      124.44      82.56        61.88         44.74        32.08     19.17    19.01      18.03     78.88      1.000 
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 18.20        20.33        7.09          22.45        12.81         9.93          9.58       34.45    44.88      15.76     19.55      -0.257
Bank credit to private sector (% of GDP) 14.19        35.10        47.86        18.55        19.43         13.31        24.17     7.20      12.11      14.94     20.69      0.487 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 9.56          4.42          1.15          3.91          9.23           2.69          0.95       2.29      0.64        4.12       3.90         0.503 
GDP per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 379.31      1,066.72   3,105.94   1,202.43   6,094.10    2,763.88   478.78   334.37  398.66    335.75   1,615.99 0.017 
Exports of goods (% of GDP) 25.12        6.00          37.72        62.53        20.84         47.26        17.62     10.27    10.08      29.12     26.66      -0.007
Imports of goods (% of GDP) 107.66      44.04        45.74        0.00          56.77         37.92        27.19     8.73      0.00        48.35     37.64      0.656 
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) -42.67 -3.78 21.27        5.27          19.72         36.86        6.36       11.26    -5.79 7.56       5.61         -0.563
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 43.51        30.94        23.78        19.71        26.54         26.95        21.13     13.28    16.87      19.63     24.23      0.839 
HFCE per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 484.68      1,063.60   1,969.11   943.06      3,917.06    955.96      367.89   286.97  330.14    259.74   1,057.82 0.136 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 11.04        3.33          7.93          10.05        6.47           10.01        4.69       39.46    4.78        9.96       10.77      -0.277
Broad money (M
₂
) as % of GDP 35.72        57.34        67.51        24.18        59.69         25.31        24.74     16.89    21.28      29.70     36.23      0.570 
Real interest rate (%) 4.78          7.73          10.26        4.86          6.99           3.71          9.97       -        6.66        14.35     7.70         -0.296
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 43.97        23.56        17.23        27.63        27.70         22.26        16.89     6.29      -          18.20     22.64      0.686 
Mauritania Niger S-Leone Congo Ghana Rwanda Ethiopia MAD Tanzania Malawi Mean Cor_
Migrant remittances  per capita  (US$) 2.50          2.31          2.24          2.12          1.65           1.65          0.92       0.69      0.18        0.09       1.44         1.000 
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 9.40          18.49        40.62        19.96        26.49         13.19        25.09     16.61    8.92        28.37     20.71      0.083 
Bank credit to private sector (% of GDP) 28.32        10.40        4.31          11.42        8.56           9.05          15.02     13.30    9.31        10.84     12.06      0.201 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 4.23          1.38          0.57          6.82          2.16           0.70          1.99       1.92      2.45        1.16       2.34         0.284 
GDP per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 428.53      186.84      232.60      1,141.62   244.07       247.44      134.92   269.03  294.57    142.67   332.23    0.358 
Exports of goods (% of GDP) 37.75        16.71        12.77        60.55        22.87         5.61          5.03       13.39    10.58      22.51     20.78      0.410 
Imports of goods (% of GDP) 37.38        19.69        21.00        26.52        32.40         16.29        15.01     18.58    23.13      22.08     23.21      0.388 
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 3.12          7.57          3.42          36.10        6.08           0.91          8.51       5.78      6.19        7.92       8.56         0.145 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.53        13.95        10.28        26.65        18.51         16.41        18.29     15.71    19.20      16.49     17.80      0.076 
HFCE per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 432.03      136.00      148.69      308.90      214.79       191.15      110.02   231.14  205.16    115.55   209.34    0.444 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 8.83          4.33          35.54        6.95          31.37         9.03          7.60       15.61    15.96      22.24     15.75      -0.115
Broad money (M
₂
) as % of GDP 18.07        14.22        16.50        16.20        19.21         15.53        28.74     18.38    21.11      17.49     18.55      -0.452
Real interest rate (%) 9.04          11.68        -1.266 10.86        -16.46 7.81          1.10       14.47    3.55        7.74       4.85         -0.026
Tax revenue (% of GDP) -            11.40        9.65          5.95          18.28         9.03          10.18     10.66    -          -        10.74      -0.135
Top-10 Migrant Remittance Recipient Countries in SSA, 1980-2009
Bottom-10 Migrant Remittance Recipient Countries in SSA, 1980-2009
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For both top-10 and bottom-10 remittance-dependent SSA countries in Table 2, there remittances per capita 
positively correlates with real GDP per capita, bank credit to private sector and investment, whilst for the 
rate of inflation and real interest rate, the correlation is negative. With the exception of real GDP per capita, 
in each of these cases, the correlation is stronger for the top-10 than the for bottom-10 countries. The 
conspicuous differences, however, are that whereas migrant remittances per capita strongly correlates with 
financial deepening and tax revenue among the top-10 countries, the direction of correlation is reverse in the 
case of the bottom-10 countries. 
 
With a coefficient in excess of 99% (Figure A3), there is near perfect positive correlation between 
remittances received per capita and remittances per migrant received in SSA and, indeed, for all other 
developing regions excluding ECA. For these other developing regions, the correlation coefficient ranges 
between 97% for MNA and 100% for EAP and LAC. In the case of ECA, a correlation coefficient of -37% 
(Figure A3) signifies a relatively low negative relationship between remittances per capita and remittances 
per migrant. Thus, generally, migrant remittances per capita should be seen as a ‘perfect’ proxy for 
remittances per migrant in developing economies, SSA inclusive. In line with this observation, Figure 2 
should be seen as providing a good insight on the dynamics of remittances sent by international migrants 
from the sub-region remit to their native SSA countries over the past 30 years. 
 
Although SSA as a sub-region has remained the least recipient of migrant remittances in the world, when 
measured in actual volume of inflows or as a ratio of population (Figure A2) or per migrant (Figure A3), on 
the basis of Figure 3 as well as Figure A2, it is evident that remittances received by the sub-region has been 
increasing steadily, especially during the post-reforms era. Comparing SSA to other developing regions, 
however, it is quite apparent that the rate of growth in total migrant remittance inflows as well as remittances 
received by the sub-region relative to population size (Figure A2) and international migrant stock is 
relatively slow (Figure 2). 
 
For the individual countries within the sub-region, the number of SSA countries that received an annual 
minimum of US$1 in remittances per capita increased from 24 in the 1980s to 30 in the 1990s and to 31 in 
the 2000s (Figure 3). In the 2000s, none of the 31 SSA countries referred to above received less than US$2 
in remittances per capita. A similar trend is observed when the number of SSA countries that received at 
least 1% of GDP is analysed. From 16 countries in the 1980s, the number of countries rose to 17 in the 
1990s before reaching 21 in the 2000s, based on the 35 sampled countries for which consistent data are 
available over the past three decades (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). Furthermore, although only 16 SSA 
countries received an annual average of US$12 million, representing a monthly average of US$1 million in 
the 1980s, as many as 24 and 29 out of the 35 sampled SSA countries received this minimum amount of 
remittances in the 1990s and 2000s respectively (see Figure A5 in the Appendix). 
 
In per capita terms, Lesotho (US$203), Cape Verde (US$184), Mauritius (US$124), Swaziland (US$83), 
Seychelles (US$62), Botswana (US$45), and Senegal (US$32) are SSA countries that have consistently 
received the highest inflows of remittances between 1980 and 2009. Nevertheless, during the immediate past 
decade, (2000-2009), Cape Verde and Mauritius displaced Lesotho and the traditional leading recipient of 
remittances in per capita terms. Benin and Botswana which ranked among the top-10 recipients of 
remittances per capita during the 1980s and 1990s, were dislodged by Nigeria and Togo in the 2000s. 
Whereas Botswana, just like Burkina Faso and Mozambique, recorded a consistent decline in remittances per 
capita over the past three decades, Nigeria defied the odds as the only country ranked among the bottom-10 
recipients in the 1980s to occupy a position among the top-10 in the 2000s. By this feat, Nigeria has not only 
managed to effectively escape from the bottom-10 in per capita terms, but to progress from the 18
th
 in the 
1980s to the first position since the 1990s as the largest recipient of actual volume of remittances received 
(compare Figure 3 above with Figure A5 in the Appendix). The situation at the opposite end of the 
remittance per capita ladder can be described as less competitive as six of the countries (Malawi, Tanzania, 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana), have never moved out of the bottom-10 category throughout the 
past three decades (Figure 3).  
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Regarding remittances as a ratio of GDP (Figure A4), as in terms of remittances per capita, Lesotho (52%), 
Cape Verde (14%) and Swaziland (7%) maintained the top-three positions in the SSA for the period, 1980-
2009, although Gambia dislodged Swaziland from the third spot in the 2000s. Here again, six countries 
(Malawi, Gabon, Tanzania, South Africa, Congo Republic and Madagascar) have remained within the 
bottom-10 recipients in terms of GDP throughout the past three decades. Nigeria originally ranked among 
the least-10 recipients moved from the 32
nd
 position with approximately 0% in the 1980s to the 14
th
 with a 
remarkable 3% in the 2000s. Other countries that made significant and consistent progress on the remittance-
GDP ladder are Guinea-Bissau which moved from 18
th
 position with about 1% to 6
th
 with 8%, Kenya 
(17
th
;1%) to (8
th
;5%), Senegal (11
th
;2%) to (5
th
;8%), and Togo (15
th
;1%) to (4
th
;9%) from the 1980s to the 
2000s. In contrast, Botswana (7
th
;4%) to (26
th
;1%), Burkina Faso (4
th
;7%) to (18
th
;1%), Mauritius (5
th
;6%) to 
(13
th
;3%), and Swaziland (3
rd
;11%) to (10
th
;4%) experienced the most significant and consistent 
retrogression on the remittance-GDP ladder.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Migrant remittances received per capita by SSA countries (in US$), 1980-2009 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010)  
Note: Only the 35 sampled countries are included due to data constraint.  
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As far as actual volume of migrant remittances received is concerned, based on 1980-2009 average in 
millions of US dollars, Nigeria (1,758), Sudan (678), Kenya (419), Lesotho (344), Senegal (330), South 
Africa (269), Mauritius (143), Mali (127) and Benin (104) are the largest recipients in SSA. These are the 
countries that received an annual average of migrant remittances to the tune of US$100 million during the 
past three decades. At the opposite end of this same ladder, Malawi (approx. 1), São Tomé and Príncipe 
(approx. 1), Gabon (4), Seychelles (5), Mauritania (5), Congo Republic (6), Tanzania (6), Guinea-Bissau (9), 
Comoros (10) and Madagascar (10), each receiving an average migrant remittances of less than US$100 
million per annum, are the least recipients between 1980 and 2009. Thus, in actual volume, Nigeria is the 
largest migrant remittance recipient in the sub-region with South Africa being the 6
th
 largest recipient, yet 
Nigeria is ranked as 14
th
(16
th
) and South Africa ranked as 20
th
(32
nd
) in relative terms of population and GDP 
respectively. Similarly, although Comoros and Seychelles are ranked as 27
th
 and 32
nd
 largest recipient of 
remittances in absolute terms, these countries are ranked 9
th
 and 5
th
 respectively in per capita terms with 
Comoros still occupying the 9
th
 position in terms of GDP. This implies that large and populous countries 
such as Nigeria and South Africa are likely to receive more migrant remittances in absolute terms whilst 
smaller and less populous countries like Comoros and Seychelles are more likely to be counted among the 
high remittance-recipients in relative terms. Notwithstanding this observation, there are reasons to believe 
that there may be certain policies and strategies that are essential to attracting remittances as some small 
countries with relatively low population size are high recipients of migrant remittances in absolute terms. 
These countries include Lesotho (4
th
), Senegal (5
th
), Mauritius (7
th
), Benin (9
th
), Cape Verde (12
th
), 
Swaziland (13
th
) and Togo (14
th
). In contrast, some large countries such as Mauritania (31
st
), Tanzania (29
th
) 
and Madagascar (26
th
), though with relatively large population, failed to attract larger volume of remittances 
over the past 30 years (see Figure A5 in the Appendix). 
 
For the group of 35 sampled SSA countries, remittances received in absolute terms have been increasing 
steadily since 1980. From a low of US$42 million in the 1980s, remittances increased by over 100% to 
US$86 million and by a further 252% to reach US$303 million in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. 
Consistent with this increasing trend, for the 35 sampled SSA countries, remittances per capita also 
witnessed a steady rise since the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1999, the average remittances received by these 
sampled countries were US$21 per annum. This figure increased to US$25 for the 1990s, and to a further 
US$33 for the 2000s. This increasing trend might be due to the fact that the growth in remittances received 
was faster than the population growth rate of the sub-region during the period under review. It must be 
emphasised that this promising positive trend, notwithstanding, remittances received by the sub-region are 
still very low and can hardly be relied upon to solve key socioeconomic problems such as poverty.  
 
Although for the sub-region as a whole remittances received as percentage of GDP has been increasing 
consistently, albeit slowly (Figure A1), it is also evident from Table A2 that, for the 35 sampled countries, 
remittances as percentage of GDP declined throughout the past three decades. For these set of countries, the 
average of remittances to GDP fell from high of 4% in the 1980s to 4% in 1990s and to a further 3% in the 
2000s. This downward trend could be attributed to two main reasons: (i) even though remittances have been 
rising in actual volumes, the growth in GDP outweighs the growth rate in remittances received by these 
sampled 35 countries unlike in the case of the entire SSA sub-region; and (ii) leading remittance-recipient 
countries (in actual volumes) such as Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, and South Africa, are also countries with 
relatively very high GDP, an explanation for the reason why none of these countries is listed among the top-
10 remittance-dependent countries when measured as percentage of GDP (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). 
For example, out of the US$151,153 million remittances received by all the 35 sampled SSA countries 
between 1980 and 2009, Nigeria, the highest recipient, with a total of US$52,754 million controlled 35%, 
whilst second highest recipient, Sudan, which received US$20,345 million in total, together with Nigeria 
controlled 48%. Therefore, as these two countries are not ranked among the top-10 remittance-GDP 
recipients in the sub-region, the overall averaged could be affected negatively as manifested. 
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3. The stylised facts of migrant remittance flows to SSA 
 
Based on the evidences from the above expositions, the underlisted are presented as constituting the stylised 
facts of international remittance flows to SSA: 
 
 SSA is the least recipient of migrant remittances when measured in terms of absolute values and in 
relation to population or in terms of total international migration stock (as revealed in Figure A2 Panels 
A and B). 
 
 In terms of remittance inflows as % of GDP, SSA is the third highest recipient after SAS and MNA in 
recent years (as depicted in Figure A2 Panel C). Since in absolute terms and in terms of population and 
international migrant stock SSA has consistently been the least recipient of remittances, but the sub-
region emerged as the third highest recipient of remittances as % of GDP. This goes to show that, in 
relative terms, the sub-region has been recording a lower rate of GDP growth than the rate of growth in 
remittance inflows in contrast to what prevails in other developing economies. 
 
 The correlation between remittance inflows per capita and remittances per migrant in SSA is positive 
and more than 99% (Figure A3). In effect, remittances per capita can be an excellent proxy for 
remittances per migrant in studies on SSA. 
 
 SSA is the only sub-region in the world that is still aid-dependent and actually receives more ODA than 
remittances since the mid-1990s (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
 
 Increasing inflows of remittances to SSA may not necessarily lead to moral hazard (dependency 
syndrome) as there exists strongly and positively correlates with exports, growth in real GDP per capita, 
but negatively correlates with household final consumption expenditure (Table 1). 
 
 As revealed by the changing trend in remittance inflows as % of GDP in Figure A1, SSA is the sub-
region with the lowest growth rate in remittance inflows and, arguably, the sub-region with the least 
volatility in remittance inflows. 
 
 Of all external capital flows to the sub-region, remittances are the least volatile as is the case in all other 
developing economies (Figure A1).  
 
 Remittance flows to SSA, in both absolute and relative terms, stagnated throughout the pre-reforms era, 
but with the inception of the reforms and especially during the post-reforms era, remittances to SSA 
have been growing at a faster rate (Figure A2). 
 
 On average, richer SSA countries (when measured in terms of real per capita GDP) are the recipients of 
higher remittances per capita, which invariably suggests higher income at home positively correlates 
with higher remittances per migrant (Table 2). 
 
 In SSA, countries that lead in attracting higher remittances (when measured in relative terms) also lead 
in attracting FDI as a ratio of GDP and these are countries with higher real GDP per capita, 
investment/GDP ratio and lower rate of inflation. This again points to the fact that macroeconomic 
performance and remittance inflows are positively related within the sub-region (Table 2). 
 
 Fiscal policy effectiveness is also crucial to remittance to attracting remittance inflows as tax 
revenue/GDP ratio positively correlates with remittances received, with stronger correlation for the top-
10 remittance recipients, which also have higher tax revenue/GDP ratio (Table 2). 
 
 On average, the higher the bank-based financial development, the more remittances received in SSA. 
Thus, one fascinating fact revealed in this paper is that, five countries, viz. Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
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Seychelles, Botswana, and Nigeria, which are classified by the IMF as having frontier financial markets 
have ‘coincidentally’ made strong showing in the top-10 remittance per capita recipients in the 2000s 
(Figure 3). A similar trend can be observed with reference to total remittances received as revealed in 
Figure A5. Even in relative to population and GDP, these 14 SSA countries with emerging and frontier 
financial markets still dominate as six and five are respectively listed among the top-10 recipients 
depending on the measure used. Virtually, all the countries ranked as least remittances recipients are 
those with highly underdeveloped financial markets. 
 
4. Conclusion and policy imperatives for SSA 
 
While recognising the heterogeneity and varying degrees of intensity of the underlying factors of 
underdevelopment, macroeconomic performance, and the timing of economic policy implementation across 
the sub-region, this paper focused essentially on macroeconomic factors, particularly financial and monetary 
policy variables, which have the most decisive consequences on the efforts of the sub-region to attract the 
requisite inflows of private foreign capital with emphasis on official remittances. There is the need for 
economic policy re-orientation directed at attracting higher remittances from abroad rather than over-relying 
on other volatile and unpredictable external capital especially ODA the inflows from which are largely 
exogenous to domestic economic policy design in recipient economies. Without doubt, the underlisted policy 
initiatives could be relevant to attracting international migrant remittances and enhancing the potential 
macroeconomic impact of remittances in SSA: 
 
 Remittances received in excess of present consumption could be used for investment purposes rather 
than on imported consumer goods, which will result in accelerated economic growth since investment is 
an injection whereas imports are leakages. 
 
 Given the changing cyclical behaviour of remittance inflows in SSA, it may important to consider 
analysing the macroeconomic determinants and impact of international remittances inflows in SSA to 
reflect how the influence of these determinants and macroeconomic effects evolve overtime.  
 
 Governments of SSA countries could establish special international relations with foreign industrialised 
countries recognised as the main destinations of their migrants, so that through an agreed framework 
(similar to what pertains under double taxation agreement among nations), migrants could remit home 
without paying transfer fees and any other charges more than once. For instance, it should be possible 
for a migrant working abroad to remit home regularly towards the payment of his/her social security 
and pension funds without paying fees for this purpose. 
 
 Implementation of macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilising the domestic prices and currency in 
SSA to motivate migrants to remit home more regularly. With stabilised domestic price and currency in 
SSA countries, it becomes easier for migrants to plan, predict and regularise the amount of money to 
remit home. 
 
 Financial institutions could develop innovative financial products and incentive packages aimed at 
enticing migrants abroad to remit home using approved routes more regularly and conveniently at 
reduced cost. This can only be done sustainably when the domestic financial sector is open to 
competition and integrated at the domestic and in the international levels. 
 
 Domestic banks could either directly go off-shore and open more branches strategically in major 
migrant ‘host’ countries or collaborate with foreign banks in these migrant ‘host’ countries so as 
strategically to increase banking convenience and access, thereby motivating SSA migrants to remit 
home more regularly and at reduced costs using official channels. 
 
 A stable macroeconomic environment with some consistency in positive real growth is a signal of good 
economic fortunes in the future. Migrants who were compelled to seek greener pastures abroad because 
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they lost hope in the domestic economy are likely to reconsider returning home in the future if there are 
better economic prospects. Such migrants are less likely to spend significant proportion of their 
earnings in their foreign resident countries, but rather remit more funds to their native countries towards 
investment projects such as financing entrepreneurial ventures. Under this circumstance, improved 
macroeconomic management could serve as a catalyst for receiving higher remittances through official 
routes in SSA. 
 
 It is crucial for SSA to develop an appropriate policy framework for attracting remittances through the 
formal transfer channels since continuous and colossal inflows of foreign currencies through 
unapproved routes, which represent additional currencies outside the banking system, could endanger 
currency stability and pose challenges for effective macroeconomic management in the long run. This 
may have adverse effects on economic growth and development prospects of the sub-region in the long 
run. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010) 
Figure A1: Trends in external capital flows to developing economies, 1970-2009 
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Source: Authors’ based on World Bank (2010) 
Figure A2: Migrant remittance flows to developing economies, 1970-2009  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010). Notes: 5-year data ranging 1970, 1975,….2005 was used as data on total international 
migration stock was not reported on annual basis by the World Bank (2010). MRPC represents migrant remittances per capita whilst 
MRPM denotes (migrant) remittances per migrant. 
Figure A3:  Remittances received per capita versus per migrant in developing economies (US$), 1970-
2009 
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Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010).  
Figure A4: Migrant remittance-dependent countries in SSA (average, based on % of GDP), 1980-2009 
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Source: Authors based on World Bank (2010).  
Figure A5: Migrant remittances received by SSA countries (annual average, in millions of US$), 1980-
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
